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THE ROLE OF SUSPICION IN FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION
Paul E. McGreal'
Recently, Professor Jed Rubenfeld wrote an essay arguing that the Supreme
Court's strict scrutiny test for equal protection works best to "smoke out" the
purpose of laws to determine whether they were enacted because of racial bias or
preference. Professor Rubenfeld criticized the Court's most recent affirmative
action decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena for departing from this
"smoking out" approach.
In this Essay, Professor McGreal explores how this "smoking out" process is
applied in federal equal protection cases. Counter to Professor Rubenfeld's view,
he argues that the Supreme Court did use a "smoking out" approach in Adarand.
His Essay discusses the Court's suspicion of racial classifications, pointing out the
Court's departuresfrom Professor Rubenfeld's view, and concludes by considering
when the Court should be suspicious of non-race, non-gender classifications.
INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses a timely and significant issue of federal constitutional law
raised in Professor Jed Rubenfeld's recent essay, Affirmative Action.' In that piece,
Professor Rubenfeld made an important and neglected point about equal protection
analysis: The Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test, the federal equal protection
standard of review applied to laws that classify based on race, works best as a
means of "smoking out" laws based on simple racial bias or preference.2 He then
criticized the Court's most recent affirmative action case, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena,3 for departing from the "smoking out" approach.4 While I agree with
much of Professor Rubenfeld's analysis, I disagree with his reading of Adarand.
This disagreement, along with my view of the logic behind the Supreme Court's
affirmative action cases, are the impetus for this Essay, which offers four
elaborations of the "smbking out" approach.
* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law. I would like to thank Bruce Burton
and Val Ricks for their comments on prior drafts of this essay.
' Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997).
2 See id at 428.
3 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
4 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 428. Professor Rubenfeld acknowledged that the
Court's prior affirmative action decision, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989), took a "smoking out" approach to strict scrutiny. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1,
at 438-39.
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First, I elaborate on how the Court's three tiers of federal equal protection
analysis-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review-all use
a means-end analysis to "smoke out" improper government purposes.' The Court
determines first whether it is suspicious that the government has acted out of bare
dislike of or prejudice against the burdened class (or bare preference for the
benefitted group).6 Next, the Court uses means-end analysis to confirm or dispel
its suspicion. If the government's action fits poorly with its asserted purpose, the
Court has confirmed its suspicion that bare dislike or prejudice (or preference) lies
behind the action. This elaboration provides background for the remaining three
observations.
Second, contrary to Professor Rubenfeld, I believe Adaranddid take a "smoking
out" approach to equal protection. I defend this view, arguing that Professor
Rubenfeld and the Court do not disagree over the propriety of the "smoking out"
approach, but rather over how that approach should be applied. In short, the Court
is suspicious of all racial classifications, while Professor Rubenfeld is not.
Third, I explain why the Court is so much more suspicious of racial
classifications than Professor Rubenfeld. The answer lies in the range of
permissible purposes each recognizes for race classifications. On the one hand, the
Court sees only one permissible purpose for racial classifications, leading it to be
very suspicious of such classifications. On the other hand, Professor Rubenfeld
sees only one impermissible purpose for racial classifications, leading him to be less
suspicious of such classifications.
Fourth, I conclude that the key question for the future of equal protection
analysis will be to articulate how the Court should determine when to be suspicious
of classifications other than race or gender.7 The Court's own opinions, as well as
some legal commentary, point in possible directions.
' For a more detailed elaboration, see Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection:
Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REv. 209, 217-52 (1998). Professor
Rubenfeld agreed that "the very purpose of equal protection means-end review-in all three
varieties-is nothing other than to assist in determining a law's true purpose." Rubenfeld,
supra note 1, at 469; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 146 (1980).
6 Professor Cass Sunstein has written about government action based on a "naked
preference" for a particular group. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 33-
34 (1993).
' Race and gender generally raise suspicion because both classifications are associated
with a history of prejudice and because both are generally irrelevant to government action.
The more difficult cases will be other classifications, which are generally not considered
suspicious. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 442 (arguing that rational basis classifications
generally lack "indicia providing reason to suspect that the law's true purpose is something
other than the advancement of legitimate state interests."); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note
6, at 30-31, 33 ("[Mlore lenient scrutiny-typified by rational review-reflects a strong
presumption that a public value is at work.").
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I. THE "SMOKING OUT" APPROACH TO EQUAL PROTECTION
Federal equal protection doctrine uses a form of means-end analysis, asking
first whether the government is pursuing a permissible end, and then whether the
law in question is an adequate means to achieve the government's end. In practice,
the Supreme Court uses one of three levels of means-end scrutiny, depending on the
classification involved.' The strictest level of scrutiny, known appropriately enough
as "strict scrutiny," applies to laws that discriminate based on race, alienage, and
national origin.9 Such laws are rarely upheld.'0 The next strictest level of scrutiny,
known as "intermediate scrutiny," applies to laws that discriminate based on
gender." The Court generally strikes down such laws if it believes they reflect
gender stereotypes. 2 The most lenient level of scrutiny, known as "rational basis
review," applies to all other laws. 3 The Court generally upholds such laws unless
it determines that the government based its decision on a desire to harm a specific
group.
14
While some have criticized the Court's three levels of equal protection scrutiny
as a rigid three-tiered hierarchy, 5 the analysis really reduces equal protection claims
to a single inquiry: Whether the government has some neutral, independent reason
for distinguishing between groups of people, or whether the law is motivated by a
bare dislike of the burdened group or a naked preference for another group.' The
s See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that
federal affirmative action programs must meet a strict scrutiny standard); see also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.3.2, at 550-52 (1997);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451-54 (2d ed. 1988).
10 See TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-6, at 1451; Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of an
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
" See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (ruling that Virginia's
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute was unconstitutional); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma law that differentiated between the
minimum ages at which males and females could purchase "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer).
2 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 9.4.3, at 609-13; TRIBE, supra note 9, § 16-6, at
1565.
" See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993)
(upholding a law that regulated local cable television systems, but exempted systems used
by multiple dwellings with common ownership).
'4 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (declaring unconstitutional
a Colorado state constitutional amendment that precluded all state or local laws from
protecting the status of homosexuals).
"s See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,231 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
16 Justice John Paul Stevens has also argued that the Court's three levels of scrutiny
mask the true structure of the Court's analysis:
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different levels of means-end scrutiny are really tools for answering this question.'7
An example should illustrate how means-end analysis can help evaluate the
sincerity of an actor's asserted purpose. Suppose a neighbor with whom you are on
questionable terms offers to wash your car. Given the history of your relationship,
you are suspicious that her offer might be less than genuine. Nonetheless, you
accept her offer. Because you are suspicious of your neighbor's motives, you watch
as she begins washing your car. You notice her using water from mud puddles on
the ground. At this point, you probably think (as you run out the door to stop her),
"Hmm. If she really wanted to wash my car, she probably wouldn't use muddy
water. That scoundrel probably wants to damage my car." This example is an
instance in which means-end analysis has revealed a person's true end. Your
neighbor asserted that her end was to wash your car. Yet, the means she chose
(using muddy water) was so ill-adapted to the task that you concluded she must
have had another purpose--damaging your car. This conclusion was bolstered by
your suspicion of her motives, given your prior history of ill will. The means-end
analysis "smoked out" your neighbor's true purpose.
Equal protection means-end analysis performs a similar "smoking out" function.
In the typical case, the government enacts a classification and offers a reason for
using the classification. Depending on the classification involved, the Court will
be more or less suspicious of the government's action. This suspicion will be quite
high with classifications, such as race and gender, that have a history of prejudice.
Whatever the classification, the Court uses means-end scrutiny to test the
government's asserted purpose and determine whether the law was really enacted
out of bias, prejudice, or preference. If the classification has a poor fit with the
government's asserted purpose, the means-end analysis has confirmed the Court's
suspicion that the government acted on another, unspoken purpose.'" If the
classification has a good fit with the government's asserted purpose, the means-end
analysis has dispelled the Court's suspicion.
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered analysis
of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of
deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to explain
decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.
Craig, 429 U.S. at 212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
17 See id.
'8 As Professor Rubenfeld notes, all this talk of the government's purpose raises
questions about the propriety of seeking or evaluating the government's actual purpose. See
Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 453 n.92. As is explained elsewhere, the Court is not trying to
determine the government's actual motivation. See McGreal, supra note 5, at 250-52. Such
an analysis would be fraught with theoretical and practical problems. See id. at 250-51.
Rather, the "smoking out" approach identifies government actions that pose an unacceptable
danger of bias or prejudice. See id at 251-52.
[Vol. 8:1
THE ROLE OF SUSPICION
City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 9 is a rational basis review case
illustrating how.the "smoking out" approach works. In Cleburne, a city zoning
ordinance required a special permit to operate a group home for the mentally
retarded; no such permit was required to operate other facilities such as hospitals,
homes for the aged, and fraternities.2" The case arose out of the city's denial of a
special permit.2 In support of its decision, the city argued that it "was concerned
with the negative attitude of the majority of property owners located within 200
feet" of the proposed group home.22 The Court explained that the city's protection
of private prejudice amounted to bare dislike of the mentally retarded: "'Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly,
give them effect."' 23 The Court also noted that the mentally retarded historically
had suffered unjustified discrimination and oppression at the hands of the
government."' Thus, based on the city's own arguments and our society's history,
the Court became suspicious that the city had acted out of bias toward the mentally
retarded.
The Court's suspicion. guided its means-end analysis of the government's
remaining purposes. The city had argued additionally that it denied the special
permit because the proposed facility would be located in a flood plain and because
of special liability issues relating to homes for the mentally retarded.25 In the
ordinary rational basis review case, in which the Court is not suspicious of the
government's motives, the Court would have deferred to the government'sjudgment
on these purposes and upheld the city's action.26 The Court in Cleburne, however,
had reason to be suspicious, and it reviewed the government's purposes with a
skeptical eye. The Court explained that, for purposes of flood concerns and liability
risks, it could see no relevant difference between group homes for the mentally
retarded and facilities that did not need a special permit (e.g., hospitals, homes for
the aged, and fraternities).2 ' Thus, the city's choice to place a greater burden on
19 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
20 See id at 436.
21 See id. at 437.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
" Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984)).
24 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 ("Doubtless, there have been and there will continue
to be instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are
properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms.").
25 See id. at 449.
26 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,488-89 (1955)
(deferring to a state judgment that sellers of ready-to-wear glasses posed a greater threat to
public health and safety than other sellers of eyewear); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (deferring to a government'sjudgment that advertising
on automobiles for hire posed a greater-threat to traffic safety than an owners advertising on
their own automobiles).
27 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
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homes for the mentally retarded was under-inclusive because it did not cover other
facilities that similarly threatened the government's purpose.28 This poor fit
between the city's classification (homes for the mentally retarded) and its purpose
(flood concerns and liability risk) confirmed the Court's suspicion that the city was
acting out of bias against the mentally retarded.2 9
IT. THE BETTER READING OF ADARAND
Professor Rubenfeld argues that Adarand used equal protection analysis not to
"smoke out" an impermissible government purpose, but rather to determine whether
a concededly injurious racial classification was justified nonetheless by a
sufficiently weighty government goal.30 He labels the latter test the "cost-benefit"
approach to equal protection analysis.3 While the "smoking out" approach uses
means-end review to determine the government's likely purpose, the "cost-benefit"
approach uses means-end review to decide whether the cost (or injury) imposed by
a racial classification is outweighed by the benefit of some government interest that
the classification helps to achieve. 2
Professor Rubenfeld bases his reading of Adarand on the following passage
from the Court's opinion:
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally because of his
or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within
the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection.... The application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines
whether a compelling governmental interestjustifies the infliction ofthat
injury.33
Contrary to Professor Rubenfeld's interpretation, this passage does not endorse
a "cost-benefit" approach to equal protection review. Rather, it restates the
28 See id.
29 See id at 450 ("The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to
rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded .... "). Cleburne stands in
contrast to Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993), which upheld another law that discriminated
against the mentally retarded. Heller involved a statute that allowed commitment of the
mentally retarded on a showing of"clear and convincing evidence," but, for commitment of
the mentally ill, required a showing "beyond a reasonable doubt". Id. at 315-18. Unlike
Cleburne, the record in Heller did not reveal any bias in the statute's history. See id. Thus,
the Court did not approach the law with suspicion.
30 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 433.
"' See id. at 437-43.
32 See id. at 439.
13 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30 (emphasis added by Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 438).
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threshold question for equal protection analysis. Before the Court can decide
whether to be suspicious of a challenged law, it must first identify the classification
created by the statute. Of course, if a statute expressly uses race (or some other
trait) to classify people, the Court's job is easy. A more difficult question for the
Court is deciding what to do if a statute does not expressly distinguish between
races, but nonetheless has a disparate impact on one race or another. Should the
Court deem such facially neutral laws as classified based on race?
In Washington v. Davis,34 the Court held that a facially neutral law classifies
based on race only if the government intended to draw such a distinction (i.e., only
if the government enacted the statute because of its effect on race, not just despite
that effect).3" The above quoted passage from Adarand is best understood as
addressing this issue when it refers to instances where "the government treats any
person unequally because of his or her race."3" In such cases, the government is
deemed to have classified by race, and it must justify such a classification with a
purpose other than bare dislike or preference (i.e., "a compelling government
interest"). Once this analysis is triggered, the Court uses strict scrutiny to "smoke
out" impermissible (i.e., non-compelling) purposes.
That Adarand applies the "smoking out" approach can be seen in several other
passages from the Court's opinion. First, the Court quoted its own defense of the
"smoking out" approach in a prior affirmative action case, City ofRichmondv. JA.
Croson, Co." The Court used this quote in response to the argument that the
purposes of some race-based laws are so clearly benign that strict scrutiny is not
required:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into thejustification for... race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
"benign" or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed,
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race
by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the
34 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" See id. at 238-48. Professor Rubenfeld agrees with the intent requirement established
by Washington v. Davis. See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 449.
36 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 229-30 (emphasis added). This reading of the quoted passage
is bolstered by another passage from the same paragraph. The Court wrote that finding a
racial classification "says nothing about the ultimate validity of a particular law; that
determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny." Id. at 230. This is the very
function of the threshold test established in Washington--to sort classifications so that the
proper means-end test can determine the law's validity.
" 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down the city's requirement that prime contractors on
city projects set aside 30 percent of their subcontracts for minority business enterprises).
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means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or
no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.38
The Adarand Court concurred, "[D]espite the surface appeal of holding 'benign'
racial classifications to a lower standard, ... 'it may not always be clear that a so-
called preference is in fact benign."' 39 The Court, however, did not need to apply
the "smoking out" approach to the challenged law. Because the lower court did not
apply strict scrutiny, the Court remanded the case for application of the correct
test.4°
The main difference between Professor Rubenfeld and Adarand is not that he
applies a "smoking out" approach and Adarand applies a "cost-benefit" approach.
Rather, the main difference, in terms of the equal protection analysis discussed in
Part I, is in deciding when a judge should be suspicious of a racial classification.
Under Adarand (and Croson), the Court is always suspicious of racial
classifications, and thus the Court always uses strict scrutiny to confirm or dispel
its suspicion of racial bias or preference." Professor Rubenfeld, on the other hand,
is not so suspicious:
[Strict scrutiny] makes little sense where the race-based purposes behind
a law are undisputed. In those circumstances there is nothing to smoke
out. No strict scrutiny would be necessary to invalidate a law banning
blacks from taking designated jobs if the law's professed purpose was
to maintain white supremacy. ... Similarly, no strict scrutiny is called
for when the undisputed purpose of a law is to assist members of one
race at a cost to members of another. The sole question is whether the
conceded race-based purpose is constitutionally legitimate.42
Yet, neitherAdarandnor Croson concede that the Court can determine with any
confidence, over the long run, whether the "undisputed purpose" of the racial
classification is benign. The Court stated in Adarand:
The point of carefully examining the interest asserted by the government
in support of a racial classification, and the evidence offered to show
that the classification is needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate
38 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
19 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
298 (1978)).
40 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239.
41 See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
4' Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 437 (emphasis added).
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from illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking. And [the
dissent] concedes that "some cases may be difficult to classify;" all the
more reason, in our view, to examine all racial classifications carefully.
... By requiring strict scrutiny of racial classifications, we require
courts to make sure that a governmental classification based on race,
which "so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment," is
legitimate, before permitting unequal treatment based on race to
proceed.43
The main disagreement between Professor Rubenfeld and the Court boils down
to this question: How confident are we that judges can accurately determine
whether a racial classification is benign and thus not deserving of suspicion?
III. THE LINK BETWEEN SUSPICION AND PERMISSIBLE PURPOSES
Professor Rubenfeld's disagreement with the Court derives from the different
range of purposes each would allow for race classifications. The Court has strongly
suggested that government may use race for only one purpose-to compensate
identified individuals or firms who have suffered race discrimination." To the
Court, any other use of race will more likely be a racial preference benefiting racial
minorities who have suffered no harm while concurrently exacting compensation
from non-minorities who have done no wrong.45 Professor Rubenfeld, on the other
hand, would allow any purpose not intended to reduce one race to an inferior social
caste.46
This Essay does not now enter the debate on permissible purposes. As
Professor Rubenfeld shows in his essay, this debate has many well-worn arguments.
One side argues that affirmative action, however defined, is a mere racial
preference.47 The other side counters that affirmative action is a legitimate means
for attaining non-discriminatory goals.4 Whoever is correct, this difference
explains why the Court is more suspicious of race classifications than Professor
43 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (quoting id at 245, and n.4 and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 534 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (1980)).
" See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (suggesting that
race-based laws should be "strictly reserved for remedial settings").
41 In Croson, the Court made clear its disapproval of statutes "motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Id. (emphasis added). "Illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority" would be racial bias and prejudice; "simple racial politics"
would be laws that classify based on race without identifying those harmed by race
discrimination.
46 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 460-62.
41 See supra notes 6 & 15-16 and accompanying text.
48 See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 444-67.
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Rubenfeld-there is more for the Court to be suspicious of. In the Court's keenly
suspicious view, there are many impermissible reasons to use race, and only one
permissible reason.49 Consistent with this view, a race-based classification is likely
to be impermissibly motivated, giving the Court much reason for suspicion.
Conversely, in Professor Rubenfeld's view, there is only one impermissible
purpose, but many permissible ones. ° In this unsuspicious view, a race-based
classification is much less likely to be impermissibly motivated, giving Professor
Rubenfeld less reason for suspicion. Indeed, since today a racial majority is
unlikely to place itself in an inferior caste position, Professor Rubenfeld generally
is not suspicious of laws that discriminate against non-minorities.5'
In sum, the main difference between the Court and Professor Rubenfeld is not
whether equal protection should take a "smoking out" approach instead of a "cost-
benefit" approach. Rather, the main disagreement is over how suspicious judges
should be of race-based laws and thus, when judges should be aggressive in
"smoking out" impermissible government purposes. This disagreement derives
from an additional disagreement over the range of permissible reasons for using
race classifications. One's position on this second disagreement will determine how
one applies the "smoking out" approach to an equal protection analysis of race-
based laws.
IV. THE FUTURE OF EQUAL PROTECTION
While this Essay has focused on race-based laws, it suggests, in this concluding
Part, that the next horizon for equal protection analysis should be closer analysis of
rational basis review. Specifically, whether ajudge should be suspicious of a non-
race, non-gender classification. Cases like Cleburne show that the Court will, and
should, be suspicious of some of these classifications, using the means-end analysis
to confirm or dispel its suspicion. 2 Questions remain, however, over what should
arouse the Court's suspicion. After briefly examining this question, this Essay
suggests two possible directions for future study.
A. The Central Dilemma of Rational Basis Review
As has been described above, something in the judicial record may trigger the
Court's suspicion. 3 In Cleburne, the record showed that the city had denied a
special permit for a group home for the mentally retarded in part because of the
"9 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
'o See Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 460-62.
"I See id. Professor Rubenfeld acknowledges that "some circumstances still would exist
in which affirmative action would be subject to strict scrutiny." Id. at 466.
52 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42.
5' See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
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prejudiced attitudes of neighboring landowners; this evidence made the Court
suspicious. 4 This example, however, begs an important question: Why were the
neighbors' attitudes properly characterized as "prejudice" instead of "rational
concern"? The question of suspicion, then, turns into the question of how to
distinguish prejudice from rational concern.
This latter question explains the disagreement between the Court and the dissent
in Romer v. Evans." In Romer, the Court reviewed a Colorado state constitutional
amendment that prohibited state or local government from enacting laws that
protected homosexuals from discrimination.56 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy characterized the amendment as an impermissible expression of animus
toward homosexuals." From this perspective, Romer was no different from
Cleburne, and Colorado's amendment was easily struck down as an unconstitutional
expression of prejudice. 8  Conversely, writing in dissent, Justice Scalia
characterized the amendment as a permissible expression of Coloradans'
disapproval of the homosexual lifestyle. 9 According to Justice Scalia, no prejudice
or bias tainted the Colorado amendment.' Rather, the amendment expressed
Coloradans' legitimate moral concerns. 1 As in Cleburne, the question was which
characterization of public sentiment is correct.62
Both the Court and the dissent assumed an answer to this question. The Court
did so when it chastised Coloradans for acting out of animus towards
homosexuals.63 Conversely, Justice Scalia did so when he accused the Court of
"mistak[ing] a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite." Both charges assume the answer
to the central question of whether the Colorado law was an expression of prejudice
or a legitimate moral concern. The problem, which neither the Court nor the dissent
' See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
35 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
56 See id. at 623-24.
" See id at 635 ("We must conclude that [the Colorado amendment] classifies
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else.").
58 See id. at 635-36.
s See id, at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6' See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 See Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of
"Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for Purposes of Equal
Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 150-51 (1998) (identifying a similar disagreement
between the majority and dissent in Romer); see also D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government
Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 102-03 (arguing that
state enforcement of morality is legitimate, because the Due Process Clause entails its own
morality).
63 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
4 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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acknowledged, is that one can reasonably characterize the Colorado amendment as
either one. The main challenge in Romer was finding a reason for choosing one
characterization over the other. Both the Court and Justice Scalia took their
characterizations as the proper starting point and built their arguments on that
foundation.
B. How to Distinguish Prejudice from Acceptable Reasons
One answer to the question ofhow to distinguish prejudice from acceptable
reason might be found in Professor Lawrence Lessig's work on the Erie effect.65 In
65 Professor Lessig's translation theory of constitutional interpretation describes the Erie
effect, typified by the classic Supreme Court case Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365, 1400-12
(1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395 (1995). Erie addressed the
issue of whether federal courts in diversity cases should apply state common law or federal
common law. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 65. About a century earlier, in Swifi v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1 (1842), the Court had held that general federal common law should govern. See
id, at 22. As Professor Lessig explains, Swift was based on the then-prevalent view that
judgesfind the common law, but do not make it. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra,
at 1400-02. Common law rules were believed to be external to the judge-something to be
found-and were not affected by the judge's personal preferences, biases, or beliefs. See id.
at 1403. Professor Lessig calls such a prevailing view an "uncontested discourse." Id. at
1393. This view of the law made some sense in the context of commercial cases like Swift,
where the common law consisted of customary business practices that formed default rules
against which parties could contract. See id. at 1402. Swift, however, was not limited to this
narrow context; it was later applied to all diversity actions. See id at 1402.
Over time, under the harsh criticism of the legal realists and others, Swift's assumption
that judges merely find the common law was openly contested by those who believed that
making common law required a substantial exercise of discretion. See id. at 1406-08. In
other words, credible arguments were voiced that common law rules were not externalto the
judges, but rather were the product of judges' unguided judgment. See id. at 1408
("Whatever the view before, today law is not conceived except as the expression of a
political will."). At this point, Swfl's assumption had become what Professor Lessig calls
a "contested discourse."
When the view of the law expressed in Swift became openly contested, the Court was
attacked for illegitimately making law for the states. See id. at 1409. As long as common law
rules were viewed as external to federal judges, those judges were merely finding pre-
existing common law principles that existed independent of who ultimately applied them,
either state or federal judges. See id at 1407-08. Once that view of law was openly
contested, however, federal judges could be criticized as imposing their political will on the
states under the guise of a general federal common law. See id, To avoid this criticism, the
Erie Court returned the power to make common law to the state courts, holding that federal
courts must apply state common law in diversity cases. See id. at 1409-11. Over time, this
holding has led to a new uncontested discourse based on Erie.
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these writings, Professor Lessig describes what he calls contested and uncontested
discourses." An "uncontested discourse" is a discourse where:
people don't, in the main, disagree about fundamentals. In the main,
they don't think much about fundamentals at all. People act, or argue,
instead, taking these fundamentals for granted .... One could
conceivably question fundamentals; one could legitimately express
doubt. But if one insisted upon these doubts, or was relentless in these
questions, then one would mark oneself as odd; somehow outside the
discourse.6
A "contested discourse," on the other hand, is "a discourse where fundamentals
in that discourse appear up for grabs; that participants in that discourse
acknowledge the legitimacy of disagreement about these fundamentals; that
disagreement is a sign of normalcy for a participant, not oddness."'68
Professor Lessig's view, no doubt oversimplified in this brief synopsis,69
supports a belief that a case like Cleburne reflects shifting discourses on mental
retardation. Whether people view discrimination against the mentally retarded as
irrational prejudice or acceptable caution will depend on the prevailing discourse
on mental retardation. At one time, general fear and disapproval of the mentally
retarded appeared normal-it was an uncontested discourse. 0 At the time of
Cleburne, however, such fear and disapproval was no longer the prevailing
uncontested discourse.7 ' Rather, a new uncontested discourse had taken its place
in which mental retardation was relevant for some purposes (such as different
educational requirements), but seen as the product of fear or disapproval when used
for other purposes." Under this new discourse, laws that were once unproblematic
look more like impermissible discrimination.
Professor Lessig's concept of contested and uncontested discourses could be
joined with a modified notion ofjudicial notice, the doctrine that allows judges to
officially recognize certain "facts" not in evidence." One commentator has
6 See Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110:An Essayon Context in Interpretive
Theory, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1785, 1785-86 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and
Constraint, supra note 65, at 1393.
67 Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 65, at 1393.
6Id.
69 For example, Professor Lessig makes even finer distinctions between discourses that
are in the background of legal debate (and thus, go relatively unnoticed) and discourses that
are in the foreground (and thus, are the subject of overt debate). See id. at 1393-1400.
70 See Cleburne, 488 U.S. at 446.
71 See id. at 442-47.
72 See id.
7 I place the word "facts" in quotation marks because judicial notice does not only apply
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suggested that it should be recognized, through the doctrine ofjudicial notice, that
judges often bring cultural assumptions, the stuff of contested and uncontested
discourses, to the task of judging.74 For example, in deciding whether a police
search of a suspect's belongings violated the Fourth Amendment, ajudge might rely
on unspoken assumptions about the demeanor and honesty of the average police
officer in the community."' Recognizing this reality, the judicial process ought to
allow these assumptions to be laid bare and subject to examination by the parties. 6
Both Professor Lessig's approach and modified judicial notice, however, hold
unsettling implications for equal protection doctrine. Both inqiiries force
recognition that most distinctions taken for granted in everyday life are socially
to what courts might call scientific facts, but also includes what courts refer to as social and
cultural understandings.
" See Bruce Burton, The "O.K Corral" Principle, 30 N.M. L. REv. (forthcoming Feb.
2000).
" See id, (discussing examples of judicial decisions that explicitly relied on such
assumptions, and arguing that such assumptions necessarily underlie criminal procedure
decisions). An infamous recent example, discussed in Professor Burton's article, is federal
District Judge Harold Baer's decision in United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). In that case, Judge Baer had to determine whether police had reasonable
suspicion to stop and search the defendant and her car. See id, at 237. He held that a
suspect's evasive behavior in the face of police presence was not unusual, and thus did not
give rise to reasonable suspicion, given the reputation of some New York City police for
corruption and brutality. See id. at 242. He wrote:
[E]ven assuming that one or more of the males ran from the comer once they
were aware of the officers' presence, it is hard to characterize this as evasive
conduct. Police officers, even those travelling in unmarked vehicles, are easily
recognized, particularly, in this area of Manhattan. In fact, the same United
States Attorney's Office which brought this prosecution enjoyed more success
in their prosecution of a corrupt police officer of an anti-crime unit operating in
this very neighborhood. Even before this prosecution and the public hearing and
final report of the Mollen Commission, residents in this neighborhood tended
to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent. After the attendant
publicity surrounding the above events, had the men not run when the cops
began to stare at them, it would have been unusual.
Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added). Under considerable political pressure to do so, Judge
Baer reversed his decision, relying on newly-offered prosecution evidence. See United States
v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on
Crime: Fairness, Reliability and the Credibility of Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 413, 415-16 (1997) ("When federal Judge Harold Baer suppressed cocaine and
heroin seized by New York City police officers, Republican presidential candidate Robert
Dole called for his impeachment. Additionally, the Clinton White House suggested it would
ask for his resignation if Judge Baer did not reverse his ruling. Judge Baer reversed his
ruling." (citations omitted)); CBS This Morning (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 29, 1996)
(transcript reported at 1996 WL 3475951) (interview in which Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of
New York City, criticized Judge Baer's ruling).
76 See Burton, supra note 74.
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constructed. This recognition has an important implication- if all that separates
an irrational prejudice from a rational distinction is a momentary social consensus,
equal protection will protect only those minorities that the majority of society (or
of the educated elite, or of the lawyer class, etc.)" currently considers worthy of
such protection." From this perspective, equal protection is a majoritarian
construct. Which minorities are protected will depend on the majority's view of
which distinctions are acceptable and which are not. Moreover, the majority's
consciousness will dictate the pace of change.
Under this majoritarian view, equal protection poses a paradox: The majority
defines minority equality rights against the majority. It is the fox guarding the hen
house.79 The only way to escape this paradox is to find some guiding principle
outside of our socially constructed discourses to distinguish prejudice from rational
distinction. Undoubtedly, religion serves as one source for personal decisions on
this score. However, religion cannot serve this role without violating the First
Amendment. If one religion condemns homosexuality and another preaches
tolerance, which one wins? The choice would require an unconstitutional
" In other words, a majority of whomever is doing the deciding in the relevant context.
Even if we see the relevant decision maker as the Supreme Court, we are still speaking about
a maj oritarian body in terms of the cultural assumptions that each Justice brings to the table.
To the extent that the Justices (or a majority of them) act based on certain uncontested
discourses, their actions will reflect the majoritarian sentiment that constructs and
perpetuates those discourses. See Lessig, Fidelity as Constraint, supra note 65, at 1420
n. 158 ("I tell the story from the perspective of white-boy's history, because how else does
one expect constitutional law to have developed? This is winner's history, and we (or I) can
do no more than tell it from the self-satisfied, morally certain, perpetually virtuous,
god-chosen perspective that is the perspective of those who have articulated constitutional
law.").
"' Justice Scalia leveled a similar criticism at the Court's equal protection analysis in
Romer. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Court takes sides in
the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more
specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from
which the Court's Members are drawn.").
71 Of course, on one level, the majority will always define minority rights in our
Constitution because that document and its amendments are the product of super-
majoritarian decision making. See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing procedures for amending
the Constitution); id art. VII (establishing procedures for ratification of the Constitution).
To the extent that the legitimacy of our government rests on consent, we ought to be
concerned about imposing legal obligations and consequences on people who neither
consented to, nor were given the opportunity to consent to, the legal order. While this
recognition does not relieve non-consenting citizens from their legal obligations, it ought to
encourage careful attention to minority rights and, in the proper case, erring on the side of
protecting the minority against the majority. Such protection of minorities would be
consistent with the framers' preference for no law making over law making. See Paul E.
McGreal, Ambition's Playground, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2000).
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privileging of one religion over another.'0 So, is there another source to which
society can appeal? This question goes to the very foundation of equal protection.
If one ultimately finds no external standard, it must be conceded that what
counts as prejudice is merely the product of prevailing uncontested discourses (i.e.,
the majority's conscious or unconscious beliefs) on the classification in question.
If one must accept this reality, one also should embrace its evolutionary character,
allowing legal decision makers, including judges, to update equal protection as our
discourses shift over time. This has been the history of equal protection during this
century, and it counsels society to reject originalist theories of equal protection if
it wants to afford minorities even a modicum of equality protection. Otherwise,
minorities will suffer a double indignity in our constitutional system. Not only are
their equality rights defined by the majority, but those rights are frozen in time,
ossified in a form even today's majority would deem unjust.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, let's return to the question that began the preceding Part: Of what
classifications should a court be suspicious? There are two ways to answer this
question, each of which suggests a future direction for equal protection analysis.
First, we could formulate some standard external from our cultural cocoon to
distinguish prejudice from acceptable reasons. This standard would tell us when
disadvantaging a group should be deemed prejudice, and when it should be deemed
acceptable. Second, if we find no external standard (or until we do so), we must
reconcile ourselves to the majoritarian nature of equal protection. As a
consequence, we should allow the doctrine to evolve, questioning more and more
classifications as time goes on, and developing analytical tools, such as Professor
Lessig's contested and uncontested discourses and modified judicial notice, to guide
that evolution.
'o See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.").
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